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Finite key analysis for symmetric attacks in quantum key distribution
Tim Meyer, Hermann Kampermann, Matthias Kleinmann, and Dagmar Bruß
Institut fu¨r Theoretische Physik III, Heinrich-Heine-Universita¨t Du¨sseldorf, D-40225 Du¨sseldorf, Germany
We introduce a constructive method to calculate the achievable secret key rate for a generic class of
quantum key distribution protocols, when only a finite number n of signals is given. Our approach
is applicable to all scenarios in which the quantum state shared by Alice and Bob is known. In
particular, we consider the six state protocol with symmetric eavesdropping attacks, and show that
for a small number of signals, i.e. below n ∼ 104, the finite key rate differs significantly from the
asymptotic value for n→∞. However, for larger n, a good approximation of the asymptotic value
is found. We also study secret key rates for protocols using higher-dimensional quantum systems.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
The possibility of secret key distribution is inherent in
quantum mechanics. Since the intriguing work of Ben-
nett and Brassard [1], who were the first to realize this
potential, much effort has been devoted to turn their
idea into feasible protocols for quantum key distribution
(QKD).
The aim of a quantum key distribution protocol is to
supply the honest parties Alice and Bob with a common,
random, and secret bit string. This key is generated by
Alice sending a number of quantum states to Bob, and
Bob measuring them randomly in one of a set of bases,
previously agreed upon by both parties. Equivalently,
this process can be seen as the distribution of an entan-
gled state between Alice and Bob, followed by appropri-
ate measurements on both sides [2, 3]. In this paper we
will use the latter approach, i.e. the entanglement-based
formulation. During the distribution phase it is unavoid-
able that the quantum state is disturbed by noise, which
– in the worst case – has to be attributed to interaction
of the notorious eavesdropper Eve.
After measuring the shared quantum state, Alice and
Bob are left with purely classical data, and employ classi-
cal algorithms to correct errors and reduce the knowledge
of Eve. For a given QKD protocol to be unconditionally
secure, in the end the honest parties must have a per-
fectly correlated string of bits, about which Eve has no
knowledge, even though she is given unlimited power (i.e.
she is only restricted by the laws of physics, but not by
any minor technological difficulties such as producing a
loss-less fiber or building a quantum computer). This
bit string is the secret key, and its length divided by the
initial number of signals is the secret key rate. This fun-
damental quantity is, due to the complexity of the various
quantum and classical steps, very difficult to determine.
Recently, important progress has been achieved to-
wards the calculation of secret key rates: unconditional
security proofs were formulated for generic QKD proto-
cols (see, for instance, [4, 5]). In this way, every proto-
col (e.g. BB84 [1], B92 [9], the Ekert protocol [10], the
six-state protocol [7, 8]) can be fit into a common frame-
work to analyze the security and derive bounds for the
secret key rate. However, these bounds only hold for the
asymptotic case, where infinitely many signals are used.
For realistic implementations, it is important to address
the case of a finite number of signals. This is the topic
of our contribution.
The outline of this article is as follows: in section II
we give an overview over the structure of QKD protocols
and explain the starting point [5] of our calculations. In
section III we review the tomographic protocol, before
we come to the main part, namely the calculation of the
entropies for the bound on the secret key rate, in sec-
tion IV. Our results are presented in section V, and we
conclude in section VI.
II. GENERAL QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION
In this section we give an overview over the structure of
common QKD protocols and introduce our notation and
some recent results [5], that will be the starting point of
our analysis.
Every QKD protocol can be divided into two parts: a
quantum part, in which quantum mechanical systems are
distributed between Alice and Bob and upon which some
measurements are carried out, yielding classical data. In
the second part, this data is transformed into a secret
key by means of classical error correction and privacy
amplification [6]. We will only consider one-way classical
post-processing, which will be described in detail below.
1. Quantum part
Most well-known QKD protocols like the BB84 [1], six
state [7, 8], B92 [9], or the Ekert [10] protocol only differ
in the type of quantum correlations that get distributed
between Alice and Bob, and how much information about
the adversary the honest parties can extract. The quan-
tum part of the protocol can be summarized by the fol-
lowing steps:
(i) Distribution. Alice prepares n′ maximally entan-
2gled states in dimension d,
|φ+d 〉 :=
1√
d
d−1∑
x=0
|xx〉 , (1)
and sends the second half of each pair to Bob.
Due to channel noise and/or Eve’s interference, this
state may get corrupted. Thus, after the distribu-
tion, Alice and Bob end up with a state ρn
′
AB, de-
scribing all n′ pairs, that is in general mixed.
(ii) Encoding/Measurement. Alice and Bob agree on a
set of r different encodings (“bases”) {|exi 〉} for the
qudit state |x〉, with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 0 ≤ x ≤ d − 1,
where 〈exi |eyi 〉 = δxy [22]. For each pair of parti-
cles, Alice and Bob choose at random an encoding
j and k and measure their particles with respect to
that basis. They obtain a classical dit value, where
the correlation between these dits depends on the
choice of the encodings. As an example, in the two-
dimensional case (d = 2) for the BB84 protocol, we
have r = 2 different encodings: |ex1,2〉, with x = 0, 1,
are the eigenstates of two Pauli operators.
(iii) Parameter estimation. By comparing a random
part of the data collected during the measurement
step, Alice and Bob can get some information about
the state ρn
′
AB. Usually, this will be the error rate,
which can be calculated for all different encodings
used in the previous step. Depending on this infor-
mation, Alice and Bob decide whether to continue
with the protocol or abort, if they cannot ensure
its security.
(iv) Sifting. Alice and Bob announce over the classical
channel which encoding they chose for each qudit
pair. All their measurement data for which the
setting matched [23] form the sifted keys X and
Y for Alice and Bob, respectively, which are not
necessarily identical yet. We denote by n the length
of the strings X and Y after the sifting step, i.e.
the number of states that were measured in the
same basis by Alice and Bob. This means that n is
approximately equal to n′ divided by the number
of different encodings used in step (ii). We denote
by ρnAB the part of the state ρ
n′
AB which is kept in
the sifting.
At this point, Alice and Bob are left with purely classical
data, namely the dit strings x and y, whereas Eve might
still hold a quantum system that was entangled with ρnAB.
We have to consider the worst case, in which Eve holds a
purifying system of ρnAB, i.e. ρ
n
AB = trE |ψABE〉〈ψABE |,
where the system in E is under Eve’s control. The sit-
uation where classical data (which is obtained from ρnAB
by Alice’s and Bob’s measurements) is correlated with a
quantum system can be described by a classical-classical-
quantum state [12]
ρXYE =
∑
x,y
PXY(x,y)P|x〉 ⊗ P|y〉 ⊗ ρxyE . (2)
Here, PXY is the probability distribution of Alice’s and
Bob’s random variables X and Y and ρxyE is the state
that Eve holds if X = x and Y = y. We use the
notation that capital letters, e.g. X , represent classi-
cal random variables, taking values x from an alphabet
X = {0, 1, . . . , d − 1}. Bold letters denote vectors, e.g.
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). We denote by P|x〉 = |x〉〈x| the
projector on the quantum state |x〉 and by PX the prob-
ability distribution of the random variable X .
2. Classical part
In this part of the key distribution, which is common
for all well-known QKD protocols (with one-way post-
processing), the classical strings X and Y will be made
equal and secure. This is achieved by the following clas-
sical sub-protocols:
(v) Pre-processing and error correction. In the pre-
processing stage Alice computes a new random
variable U from her data X by the use of the chan-
nel U← X, defined by some conditional probabil-
ity distribution PU|X. The string U will then serve
as the key. In the error correction step, Alice sends
the information that Bob needs to compute U from
his data Y. This information can be quantified by
a random variable W.
(vi) Privacy amplification. Alice and Bob shrink the
length of the keyU and at the same time reduce the
information that Eve might have about it, thereby
generating a secret key. Since the privacy ampli-
fication is an important step, which will be the
starting point of our calculation, we review this
sub-protocol in more detail here. We also review
the security analysis of privacy amplification and
present an expression for an achievable secret key
length, as found in [13].
Secret key generation by privacy amplification
Consider the case in which Alice and Bob hold a com-
mon random string U, which is supposed to serve as a
secret key. In the privacy amplification step, the infor-
mation that Eve might have about the key U is reduced.
This is done by choosing a two-universal hash function
F and computing F (U) as the new key. A two-universal
hash function is a random function F : U → {0, 1}ℓ
such that F (u) and F (u′) are independent and uni-
formly distributed for all u 6= u′ [13]. Then the infor-
mation that Eve can have about F (U), depending on
the quantum state ρE she holds, can be bounded [13].
This result can be applied to calculate the secret key
rate obtainable by Alice and Bob. “Secrecy” is mea-
sured with respect to the universal composable defini-
tion of unconditional security [14]: Let SA and SB be
random variables that describe keys that Alice computes
3from U and Bob computes from his guess about U, us-
ing the random hashing. This situation, together with
Eve holding a quantum state containing some informa-
tion about the keys, can be described by the classical-
classical-quantum state ρSASBE . The case of a perfect
key, i.e. SA = SB = S, where S is uniformly dis-
tributed over the set of all possible keys S and Eve
being completely uncorrelated with S is described by
ρSS ⊗ ρE := 1/|S|
∑
s∈S P|s〉 ⊗ P|s〉 ⊗ ρE . The key pair
SA,SB is said to be ε-secure, if ‖ρSASBE−ρS⊗ρE‖ ≤ ε.
Here, ‖ρ − σ‖ = tr|ρ − σ|/2, with |A| =
√
A†A, denotes
the trace distance between ρ and σ. It provides a mea-
sure of how close the actual system is to the ideal case
and how “secure” the final key will be.
An important result which will be used here was found
in [13] (see also [5]): Suppose Alice and Bob both share
the same random string U, which they compute from
their raw data strings X and Y via pre-processing and
error correction. The adversary holds some quantum sys-
tem ρE that might be correlated with U, i.e, the total
system can be represented by some density operator ρUE .
Then an achievable length ℓ of the secret key that can be
computed from U by a two-universal hash function F is
given by [13]:
ℓ = Sε
′
2 (ρUE)− Sε
′
0 (ρE)− 2 log2(1/ε), (3)
with ε′ = (ε/8)2, if the key is required to be ε-secure
with respect to ρE ⊗ P|F 〉. Here, the state ρE ⊗ P|F 〉
describes the total knowledge of Eve, since she also learns
the function F on which Alice and Bob have to agree by
public communication. The quantities Sε2 and S
ε
0 that
occur in Eq. (3) are called smooth Renyi entropies and
are defined as follows.
Denote by Bε(ρ) the set of density matrices that are
ε-close to ρ, i.e. Bε(ρ) := {σ ∈ S(H) : ‖ρ − σ‖ ≤ ε},
where S(H) is the set of density matrices acting on the
Hilbert space H.
Definition 1. Let ρ ∈ S(H) and ε ≥ 0. The ε-smooth
Renyi entropies of order 2 and 0 are defined as
Sε2(ρ) = − log2 inf
σ∈Bε(ρ)
trσ2, (4)
Sε0(ρ) = log2 inf
σ∈Bε(ρ)
rankσ. (5)
In the following, we will also need a classical Renyi
entropy, which is defined as follows:
Definition 2. Let X and Y be random variables, tak-
ing values x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, respectively, and let PXY
be their probability distribution. Then the conditional
smooth Renyi entropy of order zero is defined as [15]
Hε0 (X |Y ) := min
A:P (A)≥1−ε(
max
y∈Y
log2 |{x ∈ X : PXA|Y=y(x) > 0}|
)
. (6)
Here, the minimum is taken over all events A that
occur with probability at least 1 − ε. Smooth Renyi en-
tropies are generalizations of the conventional Renyi en-
tropies [16]: The classical Renyi entropy of a probability
distribution PX is a measure of the largest (in the case
of S2) or smallest (in the case of S0) uncertainty about
X that can be found within all probability distributions
that are close [24] to PX . In the quantum case, this
translates to the entropy of density operators that have
a trace distance to ρ that is less or equal to ε.
If we want to apply Eq. (3) to our QKD protocol, we
need to specify the overall quantum state representing
Alice’s and Bob’s classical strings and the information
that Eve holds, which might be at least partly of quan-
tum nature: It consists of a density operator ρxyE that
depends on the strings x and y that Alice and Bob have
measured, together with the classical information that is
interchanged via the public channel, i.e. the error correc-
tion information w. After the error correction, Alice and
Bob both hold the same string u. Thus, the situation
can be described by the following quantum state:
ρUWE =
∑
x,y,u,w
PXYUW(x,y,u,w)P|u〉 ⊗ (P|w〉 ⊗ ρxyE ).
(7)
If we now use Eq. (3) to calculate the key length, we still
have the dependence on the error correction information
W. In [5] it was shown that it can be removed, leading
to another additive term Hε0 (U|Y), which is the informa-
tion needed to correctly guessU fromY with probability
of at least 1−ε. The quantity Hε0 is called (classical) con-
ditional smooth Renyi entropy, and was defined above.
We will restrict ourselves to the simple case where Al-
ice skips the pre-processing step (first part of step (v) in
our generic protocol, cf. section II), i.e. U = X. This
leads to the following formula for an achievable length of
the ε-secure key, which will be the starting point of our
calculations:
ℓ = Sε
′
2 (ρXE)− Sε
′
0 (ρE)−Hε
′
0 (X|Y) − 2 log2(1/ε), (8)
with ε′ = (ε/8)2.
III. THE TOMOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL
Although equation (8) is an explicit formula for an
achievable key length for any QKD protocol that fits into
the framework described in section II, the main problem
is the ignorance about Eve’s state ρE . If this state is not
known, the entropies in Eq. (8) cannot be calculated.
However, the data gathered in the parameter estimation
step (iii) poses some restrictions on Eve’s state. For ex-
ample, in the BB84 protocol, starting from |φ+〉 as de-
fined in (1) with d = 2, a measured bit error rate eb
implies a fraction eb of |ψ+〉〈ψ+| and |ψ−〉〈ψ−| of the
n qubits shared by Alice and Bob (here |φ±〉 and |ψ±〉
are the usual Bell states). Thus it is possible to deduce
part of the structure of Eve’s purification. Exploiting
4this knowledge, one can obtain a lower bound on Eq. (8)
by taking the infimum over all states of Eve that are
compatible with the statistics obtained in the parame-
ter estimation step. Having this in mind, we make the
following assumptions for our finite key analysis:
1. Collective attack. The state that Alice and Bob
share after the distribution step is given by
ρn
′
AB = ρ
⊗n′
AB , (9)
i.e. Eve interacts only with individual signals and
does so in the same way for all copies. Note that
this is not really a restriction, since in [5] it was
shown that Alice and Bob can always symmetrize
the state ρn
′
AB to a tensor product form by only
slightly modifying the protocol.
2. Symmetric attack. Each single state is a depolar-
ized version of the maximally entangled state (1),
i.e.
ρAB = (β0 − β1)|φ+d 〉〈φ+d |+
β1
d
1. (10)
We have adopted here the notation of [17]. The two pa-
rameters β0 and β1 are not independent, and the nor-
malization condition reads β0 + (d − 1)β1 = 1. One
can interpret β0 as the probability that Alice and Bob
get the same output, and β1 as the probability that
they get a particular other one, so we always assume
0 ≤ β1 < 1/d < β0 ≤ 1. In the limit n → ∞, the error
rate in the sifted key (for d = 2, this is called the quantum
bit error rate, QBER) is given by 1− β0 = (d− 1)β1.
We make no further restrictions on the eavesdrop-
ping strategy besides being collective and symmetric, and
therefore assume that Eve holds the purifying system of
each state ρAB. It is important to note that by fixing the
form of the distributed state ρnAB (as in Eq. (9) and (10)),
which is the “output” of the whole quantum part of the
protocol (cf. section II), the encoding step (ii) essentially
becomes meaningless. This is because we now have the
freedom to choose any kind of encoding, since in the end
we are assuming ρnAB = ρ
⊗n
AB with ρAB given by (10) any-
way. However, as Eve knows Alice’s and Bob’s protocol,
she would not necessarily conduct such a symmetric at-
tack if Alice and Bob could not check for the state ρAB
to be of the form (10). Therefore, we assume that Alice
and Bob use a scheme that enables them to do so, which
is achieved by encoding the basis states {|x〉} into d+ 1
mutually unbiased bases, which corresponds to a gener-
alization of the six-state protocol to d dimensions (where
d is a prime power). Such a “tomographic” protocol was
originally suggested in [17, 18], in the context of a con-
nection between advantage distillation and entanglement
distillation. In the parameter estimation step (iii), the
only unknown parameter β0 (or β1) in Eq. (10) can be
estimated by comparing a randomly chosen subset of the
raw key.
IV. METHOD FOR CALCULATING SMOOTH
RENYI ENTROPIES
In this section, we derive a method for calculating an
achievable secret key length for our generic protocol in-
troduced in the previous section. This method is appli-
cable in all scenarios, in which the state ρnAB is known.
Explicitly, we will study as an example the state for a
symmetric attack, as defined via Eqns. (9) and (10). For
a given state ρnAB (and its purification), the difficulty in
computing the key length (8) is due to the minimization
over the ε-environment Bε(ρ) involved in the (quantum)
smooth Renyi entropies. This is because very little is
known about the structure of the set of density matri-
ces that are close to a given one. Even for states with
a tensor structure, as for ρ⊗nAB in our case, the analysis
is still very involved, since Bε(ρ⊗n) of course not only
contains product states. Fortunately, since we are only
interested in minimizing a function of the eigenvalues of
density matrices, it turns out that we can restrict our
attention to matrices which have the same eigenvectors
as ρ. This intuition is formalized in Lemma 1.
Let us denote by λ(ρ) the ordered spectrum of ρ, i.e.
λ(ρ) = (λ1, . . . , λd) ∈ Rd in ascending order, with d =
dim(H). Also denote by ‖λ− λ′‖ = 1/2∑i |λi − λ′i| the
distance of the vectors λ and λ′. Recall that Bε(ρ) is the
set of density matrices which are ε-close to ρ. We define
Dε(ρ) = {σ ∈ S(H) : [σ, ρ] = 0, ‖λ(σ)−λ(ρ)‖ ≤ ε} to be
the set of density matrices which commute with ρ (i.e.
they have the same eigenvectors) and have a spectrum
ε-close to that of ρ.
Lemma 1. The two sets ΛεB(ρ) = {λ(σ) : σ ∈ Bε(ρ)},
and ΛεD(ρ) = {λ(σ) : σ ∈ Dε(ρ)}, defined as the sets
of spectra that correspond to the sets of density matrices
Bε(ρ) and Dε(ρ), respectively, are identical.
Proof. Since for two commuting matrices ρ and σ, we
have that ‖ρ − σ‖ = ‖λ(ρ) − λ(σ)‖, it follows im-
mediately that Dε(ρ) ⊂ Bε(ρ) which in turn implies
ΛεD(ρ) ⊂ ΛεB(ρ). The other inclusion follows from the
fact [19] that ‖ρ− σ‖ ≥ ‖λ(ρ)− λ(σ)‖.
From this lemma, it follows immediately that all func-
tions than only depend on the eigenvalues of a density
matrix and which are to be minimized over the set Bε(ρ)
can equivalently be minimized over Dε(ρ). In particu-
lar, this holds for the smooth Renyi entropies defined in
Def. 1.
Our goal is to calculate the achievable key rate in the
case where Alice and Bob hold an n-fold tensor product
of the state ρAB, as defined by Eq. (10). It was shown
in [18] that a purification of the state (10) is given by
|Ψ〉 =
√
β0
d
d−1∑
k=0
|kk〉|Ekk〉+
√
β1
d
∑
k 6=l
|kl〉|Ekl〉, (11)
where Eve’s states |Ekl〉 are constrained by 〈Ekk|Ell〉 =
1 − β1/β0 for k 6= l and |Ekl〉 is orthogonal to all other
states for k 6= l.
5To calculate the key length (8), we need to know the
states ρXE = 1/d
n
∑
x,y PXY(x,y)P|x〉 ⊗ ρxyE and ρE =
trXρXE . Bob’s random variable Y does not appear here
explicitly, since it is equal to that of Alice after the error
correction. From Eq. (11), we can readily compute ρxyE ,
which is the state that Eve holds if Alice and Bob got
the string x and y as their measurement results, as well
as the probabilities PXY(x,y). We find
ρXE =

1
d
∑
x
P|x〉 ⊗

β0P|Exx〉 + β1∑
y
y 6=x
P|Exy〉




⊗n
(12)
ρE =

1
d

β0∑
x
P|Exx〉 + β1
∑
x,y
y 6=x
P|Exy〉




⊗n
(13)
PXY(x,y) =
n∏
i=1
[β1 + δxiyi(β0 − β1)] . (14)
Due to the properties of the states |Exy〉, it follows that
Eve’s state ρE has rank d
2n if β0 6= 1, and rankρXE =
d3n if β0 6= 1.
In the following three subsections, we analytically com-
pute the entropies that appear in Eq. (8). It turns out
that they are given by simple functions of the eigenvalues
of the corresponding density matrices. Unfortunately,
they cannot be expressed in a closed form, so in the end
we have to resort to numerics in order to obtain numbers.
However, all numerical calculations stay exact without
any approximations, and can be performed in a very ef-
ficient way. We explain the calculations of the entropies
in some detail, since we believe that our method is inter-
esting and useful on its own, as it can be used whenever
one wants to determine the extremum for a function of
the spectrum of a state, in the neighborhood of a given
density matrix.
A. Calculation of Sε0(ρE)
To calculate Sε0(ρE), we need the eigenvalues of the
state ρE ∈ S((Cd)2n). It turns out that ρE , as defined
in Eq. (13), has the following eigenvalues λl and corre-
sponding multiplicities nl, for 0 ≤ l ≤ n, where n is the
number of signals after the sifting:
λl :=
(
β0 − β1 + β1
d
)l (
β1
d
)n−l
(15)
=
(
β0(d+ 1)− 1
d
)l(
1− β0
d(d− 1)
)n−l
(16)
nl :=
(
n
l
)
(d2 − 1)n−l (17)
Note that the λl are given in ascending order. We will use
the convention that λl denotes all different eigenvalues of
ρE , and therefore an index of λ runs from 0 to n, although
there are d2n eigenvalues in total, which we will denote
by λ′, such that {λl}0≤l≤n = {λ′l′}1≤l′≤d2n .
Now and in the following we use Lemma 1, which
allows us to calculate the infimum in Sε0(ρE) =
log2 infσ∈Bε(ρ) rankσ by only varying the eigenvalues of
ρE . Thus we are looking for a density matrix σ with
eigenvalues {µi} which is diagonal in the same basis as
ρE and has rank as small as possible under the con-
straints
∑
i |λ′i − µi| ≤ 2ε. Clearly, such a matrix is
given by σ = diag (0, . . . , 0, λ′k+1, . . . , λ
′
d2n−1, λ
′
d2n + δ),
where
∑k
i=1 λ
′
i =: δ ≤ ε with k chosen maximally. In
this way we have found rankσ = rank ρE − k. It remains
to determine k, which can be done efficiently because of
the degeneracy of the eigenvalues. Below we construct an
algorithm that computes k in Ø(n) running time, rather
than scaling with the total number of eigenvalues Ø(dn).
In order to calculate k, define
sr :=
r∑
i=1
ni−1λi−1, (18)
for 0 ≤ r ≤ n + 1, which is the sum of the r smallest
different eigenvalues. (For r = 0, the sum is taken to be
zero.) Moreover, let
b := max{r : sr ≤ ε} (19)
be the the largest number such that the sum of the b
smallest different eigenvalues is smaller than ε. A mo-
ment of thinking then reveals that k is given by
k =
b∑
i=1
ni−1 +
⌊
ε− sb
λb
⌋
, (20)
where ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer smaller than or
equal to x. This leads to
Sε0(ρE) = log2(d
2n − k). (21)
B. Calculation of Sε2(ρXE)
The calculation of Sε2(ρXE) is similar to the calcula-
tion of Sε0(ρE). We first need the eigenvalues of ρXE ∈
S((Cd)3n), defined in Eq. (12), and their multiplicities.
This matrix has d2n non-zero eigenvalues in total:
λl+1 :=
(
β0
d
)l(
β1
d
)n−l
(22)
=
1
dn
βl0
(
1− β0
d− 1
)n−l
(23)
nl+1 := d
n
(
n
l
)
(d− 1)n−l, (24)
for 0 ≤ l ≤ n. Moreover, ρXE has d3n − d2n zero eigen-
values, independently of β0 and β1:
λ0 := 0 (25)
n0 := d
3n − d2n (26)
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FIG. 1: Visualization of the definition of x, y, and s±r , to-
gether with the eigenvalues λl and multiplicities nl as defined
in section IVB. In this example, we have b− = 1 and b+ = 3.
Altogether, we have 0 ≤ l ≤ m, withm := n+1, denoting
all different eigenvalues.
Recall that Sε2(ρ) = − log2 infσ∈Bε(ρ) trσ2, thus we are
looking for a density matrix σ with ordered eigenvalues
{µi} that minimizes
∑
i µ
2
i under the constraints
∑
i µi =
1 and
∑
i |λi − µi| = 2ε. Using the Lagrange multiplier
method it can be shown that the solution is
µi =


x for 0 ≤ i ≤ b−
λi for b
− < i < n− b+
y for n− b+ ≤ i ≤ m
, (27)
with some constants x, y, b−, b+ which have to be deter-
mined. This means that the smallest b− + 1 eigenvalues
λ get raised to x, the largest b++1 get lowered to y, and
the intermediate ones stay unchanged. Since the mean∑
i µi/d
3n has to remain 1/d3n, we find y and x by cut-
ting the largest (smallest) eigenvalues such that the sum
of differences between the largest (smallest) ones and y
(x) equals ε (see also Fig. 1).
In the following, we give an efficient algorithm for cal-
culating the constants x, y, b−, and b+, which is very sim-
ilar to the one calculating Sε0(ρE) in the previous section.
Let
s+r :=
r∑
i=1
nm−i+1(λm−i+1 − λm−r), (28)
s−r :=
r∑
i=1
ni−1(λr − λi−1), (29)
for 0 ≤ r ≤ m = n+ 1. Then the number of the largest
(smallest) different eigenvalues, that can be lowered to y
(raised to x) is given by
b± := max{r : s±r ≤ ε}. (30)
With these definitions we find that
x = λb− +
ε− sb−∑b−
i=0 ni
, (31)
y = λm−b+ −
ε− sb+∑b+
i=0 nm−i
. (32)
Having calculated the eigenvalues µi, the entropy is fi-
nally given by
Sε2(ρXE) = − log2

 b−∑
i=0
nix
2 +
b+−1∑
i=b−+1
niλ
2
i+
m∑
i=b+
niy
2
)
. (33)
C. Calculation of Hε0(X|Y)
Recall the definition of the conditional ε-smooth Renyi
entropy of order zero,
Hε0(X|Y) := min
A:P (A)≥1−ε
(
max
y
log2 |PAy|
)
, (34)
where we have introduced P
Ay := {x : PXA|Y=y(x) >
0}. First note that Hε0(X|Y) depends only on the num-
ber of elements in the set P
Ay, i.e. on the number of
non-zero entries in the probability distribution PXA|Y=y.
Since in our case all values of PX|Y=y are non-zero for all
y (except for the case of perfect correlations, i.e. β0 = 1),
the maximization over y can be omitted. Thus the only
restriction on the number of non-zero probabilities comes
fromA. The minimization over all these events occurring
with probability larger or equal to 1−ε can be tackled in
the following way: All relevant eventsA need to be of the
form [X = x1]∨· · ·∨[X = xk], with
∑k
i=1 PX(xi) ≥ 1−ε.
Since we are looking for the smallest set P
Ay (y being
arbitrary), we are interested in those events which are
most restrictive, i.e. which have k as small as possible.
This means we need to find the smallest number k such
that the sum of the k largest probabilities in PX|Y=y is
greater or equal to 1 − ε. To this end we look at the
probability distribution (14) and find the following prob-
abilities pl and occurrences nl, when we condition on a
certain value y:
pl := β
l
0β
n−l
1 (35)
nl :=
(
n
l
)
(d− 1)n−l (36)
In analogy to the calculation of Sε0(ρE), define
sr :=
r∑
i=1
nn−i+1pn−i+1, (37)
with 0 ≤ r ≤ n+1, to be the sum of the r largest different
probabilities pl. Then the smallest number b such that
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FIG. 2: Key rate versus signal number n for three different
values of the security parameter (from top to bottom: ε =
0.5, 0.2, 0.01) for a fixed error rate in the sifted key 1− β0 =
0.02. The dashed line is a lower bound of the asymptotic
value limε→0 limn→∞ ℓ/n = 0.758059 found in [5].
the sum of the largest b different probabilities is greater
or equal than 1− ε is given by
b := min{r : sr ≥ 1− ε}. (38)
With these definitions we find
k =
b∑
i=1
nn−i+1 −
⌊
sb − (1− ε)
pn−b+1
⌋
. (39)
Finally, we arrive at
Hε0 (X|Y) = log2 k. (40)
V. RESULTS
In the previous section, we calculated the entropies
involved in the formula for the achievable key length (8).
Each entropy is given as a simple function that can be
evaluated numerically in a very efficient way with only
O(n) running time. Note that all results are exact (up to
machine precision), since no approximations are needed
at all. Still, the parameter n (the number of signals) is
crucial in the implementation and we are limited to values
of the order 104 in this quantity. However, this is not a
conceptual limitation: using more powerful computers,
it is feasible to push this limit further, but we do not
believe that this approach would yield surprising results,
in view of the results presented in this section.
The scenario that we are investigating is described by
the following parameters: The number n of (quantum)
signals sent from Alice to Bob which are kept during the
sifting step, the error rate in the sifted key 1 − β0 (see
Eq. (10)), the security parameter ε, and the dimensional-
ity d of the quantum systems sent from Alice to Bob. For
better accessibility, we plot the secret key rate r, which
is defined as r = ℓ/n, rather than the key length ℓ.
Figure 2 shows a plot of the obtainable key rate r, as a
function of the number n of signals that were measured
in the same basis by Alice and Bob. In this example
we keep the error rate fixed at 1 − β0 = 0.02 and show
plots for different security parameters ε. The error rate
is chosen such that we are looking at the regime where
the key rate is large and where a simple pre-processing
does not seem to play any role [5]. For comparison, we
also plot a lower bound on the secret key which holds
for any eavesdropping attack, but is only exact in the
limiting case n→∞; this result was recently derived by
Renner et. al [5]. Our key rates approach the asymptotic
value r = 0.758059 as n grows. From the plot, we recover
the result found in [5] that in the limit n → ∞, the de-
pendence on the security parameter ε becomes negligible,
as the three curves for different ε approach each other.
Note that for a small number of signals the secret key
rate shows a considerable deviation from the asymptotic
value. For a value of n = 104, however, the key rate
for even a small ε = 0.01 reaches already over 83% of
the asymptotic value. To give a comparison with exper-
imental implementations, e.g. the number of signals n
(after sifting, but before classical post-processing) in the
experiment described in [20] is of the order of 105.
A prominent feature of our results are the “oscilla-
tions” of the achievable key rate, the amplitude of which
decreases as n increases. Analytically, the oscillations
arise from the structure of ℓ given in Eq. (8), being the
difference of the three monotonic functions Sε
′
2 , S
ε′
0 , and
Hε
′
0 where the last two are smoothened versions (see
Fig. 3) of a non-continuous function. In the limit n→∞,
the non-continuities disappear, leading to a monotonic
key rate. Up to now, we can give no physical explana-
tion for the non-monotonicity, besides the fact that our
formula is just an achievable key rate and thus only a
lower bound on the optimal key rate. Moreover, we dis-
regarded the classical pre-processing step in our analysis,
and thus the key rate might also increase in some cases.
Note that up to now, no one-way pre-processing protocols
except for the addition of noise [5] have been studied. It
was found that the addition of noise has no effect on the
key rate if the correlations between Alice and Bob are al-
most perfect (as in Fig. 2), but the rate can be increased
in the region where 0.88 . β0 . 0.92.
The dependence of the secret key rate on the error rate
1− β0 is visualized in Fig. 4: The secret key rate is only
non-negative for error rates smaller than ≈ 0.11 and gets
larger as the error rates 1−β0 is decreased. The key rate
for finite n is always smaller than the asymptotic value
(unless 1 − β0 = 0), and it increases as ε increases, i.e.
as the required security decreases.
Since our formulas are valid not only for qubits, but
also for higher-dimensional systems, we can study the in-
fluence of the dimensionality on the obtainable key rate.
To be able to compare the efficiency of encoding the in-
formation in d = 2, 3, 4 dimensions, we introduce the
quantity n˜ := n′d = n(d+ 1)d which quantifies the total
resources needed in the protocol: We have already men-
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FIG. 3: Plot of the three entropies in Eq. (8) constituting the
secret key length ℓ up to an additive term 2 log2(1/ε). In this
example we have 1− β0 = 0.02 and ε = 0.5.
tioned that the number of signals before (n′) and after
the sifting (n) are related by n = n′/(d+1), where d+1
is the number of different encodings used (we consider
the “tomographic protocol”). The factor d accounts for
the dimension of the single quantum system. We com-
pute the “effective key rate ” ℓ/n˜, i.e. the key length,
measured in bits, divided by the “total dimensionality”
of the Hilbert space of all signals of the raw key (be-
fore the sifting). In this way we have quantified the rate
with respect to the number of initial resources needed to
create the key. Recall that 1 − β0 = (d − 1)β1 is the
error rate (in the limit n → ∞) in the sifted key, which
is called quantum bit error rate (QBER) in the case of
dimension d = 2. This quantity gives the fraction of er-
rors per dit in the sifted key, which makes it difficult to
compare different dimensions, unless one can make rea-
sonable statements about how the error rate 1−β0 scales
with d, i.e. how the eavesdropper treats different dimen-
sions. Keeping this problem in mind, we see in Fig. 5
the dependence of the effective key rate ℓ/n˜ on the error
rate 1−β0, for a fixed n˜ = 20000 and security parameter
ε = 0.1. We can read off the maximal tolerable error rate
for which a secret key can still be extracted and fortify
the result found in [21], namely that the robustness of a
QKD protocol increases as the dimension d of the quan-
tum systems increases. This result also holds if sifting is
disregarded, i.e. if we keep dn fixed and look at ℓ/(dn).
On the other hand, if Alice and Bob are highly correlated
(β0 → 1), we find the reverse dependence on the dimen-
sion: A qubit system yields the highest effective key rate
and this rate decreases as the dimension d increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a method for the explicit calcula-
tion of the secret key rate in quantum key distribution
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FIG. 4: Key rate r plotted versus the error rate in the sifted
key, 1 − β0, for a fixed number of signals n = 20, 000. The
three solid lines correspond to different security parameters
(from top to bottom: ε = 0.5, 0.2, 0.01). The dashed line is
again the asymptotic value limε→0 limn→∞ l/n.
with a finite number of signals n, under the assumption
that the eavesdropper only conducts symmetric collec-
tive attacks, i.e. the state shared by Alice and Bob after
the quantum part of the protocol (cf. section II) has the
form ρ⊗nAB = [(β0−β1)|φ+d 〉〈φ+d |+β11/d]⊗n. At this step,
Alice and Bob have to measure this state in the compu-
tational basis to obtain the classical bit strings that are
the starting point of the classical post-processing. This
means that any protocol in which Alice and Bob can
ensure that they share such a state and which uses pri-
vacy amplification is covered by our analysis. In reality,
obtaining knowledge about ρ⊗nAB is a hard task, but we
believe that our analysis of the idealized case helps in
solving the challenge of a finite key analysis of a more
general scenario.
We have shown that the secret key rate obtainable by
our protocol strongly depends on the number of quantum
signals sent. Our results suggest that for signal numbers
larger than n ∼ 104, the asymptotic value for the key
rate found by [5] is a good approximation. However, for
smaller values of n, we find a significantly lower value.
This is remarkable in particular because we restricted our
analysis to a symmetric eavesdropping strategy, thereby
weakening Eve’s power and potentially increasing the ob-
tainable key rate. In contrast, the result found in [5] cov-
ers all eavesdropping attacks and thus the asymptotic
value of r is already based on pessimistic assumptions.
Therefore, our results suggest that for scenarios with only
a few number of signals, significant deviations of the key
rate from the asymptotic value are to be expected.
A popular task in the analysis of quantum key distribu-
tion is the characterization of the threshold QBER, which
is the maximal quantum bit error rate, for which the pro-
tocol still yields a non-vanishing key rate. However, even
a high threshold QBER does not guarantee a feasible pro-
tocol, as the key rate might be arbitrarily close to zero or
increase very slowly with decreasing QBER. Our results
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dotted line) for a fixed n˜ = 20000 and ε = 0.1, plotted versus
the error rate in the sifted key 1− β0.
on the other hand quantitatively characterize the secret
key rate with respect to all parameters of the protocol.
In particular, we have shown that for d-dimensional gen-
eralizations of the six-state protocol, larger dimensions
give a higher robustness, i.e. more noise is tolerable, but
smaller dimensions yield a higher key rate if the the cor-
relations between Alice and Bob are already high.
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